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‘Human Nature’, Science and International Political Theory1 
 
Enough is known, enough has been written, about what divides people: 
my purpose is to investigate what they have in common. (Zeldin, 1999: 
16) 
 
Introduction:  A Contradiction Outlined. 
 
Humanitarianism, human rights, humanity, human nature – there’s a family 
resemblance between these notions that is difficult to miss, and yet the discourse 
of international political theory does its best to do so, and the result is a pattern 
of thought and action that contains strange contradictions.  On the one hand, 
since 1945 the individual has become active in international relations, as both 
subject and object, to a degree not seen previously in the so-called Westphalia 
System.   
Thus, the international human rights regime purports to grant very extensive 
rights to individuals – granted the state is generally seen in international law as 
the delivery system for these rights, in the same way that the state is responsible 
for upholding International Humanitarian Law which, before 1945, was the main 
vehicle for granting status to the individual in international relations, but still the 
growth and elaboration of the international human rights regime no longer 
seems to be something that is comprehensible within a state-centred framework.  
Further, International Criminal Law (ICL) has developed at high speed in the 
post-1945 period, and especially post-1989.  The International Criminal Court, 
established in 2002 on the basis of the Rome Statute of 1998, and building on the 
International Criminal Tribunals for Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, represents 
a potentially revolutionary development, in principle capable of holding 
individual national leaders criminally responsible for acts which previously 
would have been regarded as covered by sovereign immunity.  Perhaps equally 
                                                        
1  Originally presented as the Keynote Address at the 9th Central And East European International 
Studies Association Convention, Krakow, Poland 20 September 2012. I have had the advantage of 
very helpful criticisms from three readers, but in the interests of stimulating debate I have left 
the body of the argument unchanged, making only marginal clarifications and corrections; more 
than is usually the case, all errors are indeed my responsibility. 
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revolutionary has been the development of notions of universal jurisdiction, the 
claim that individuals who are alleged to have committed certain crimes in one 
jurisdiction can be tried in another.  
And, moving beyond the formal/legal dimensions of international relations, 
scholars of international political theory and of globalisation have identified the 
individual as the focus for their work.  Theorists of global justice reject the state-
centrism of much conventional Westphalian political theory, exemplified most 
recently by John Rawls in his Law of Peoples in favour of an emphasis on the 
individual – people not peoples, as the trope has it (Rawls, 1999).  This 
refocusing is echoed in cosmopolitan theorising on global governance, where it is 
suggested that state-centric bodies such as the UN should be shadowed by 
popularly-elected chambers, and by globalisation theorists who stress the role of 
global civil society as a route through which individual opinion can be heard.  In 
the same vein, modern means of communication and the development of global 
brands of both consumer goods and the politics of protest have elevated some 
‘powerful people’ to positions of political influence as individuals in spite of their 
lack of direct access to the levers of state power.   
One could continue to offer examples to make the point, but, in summary, the 
individual is a part of contemporary international relations, and the study of 
International Relations to an extent that would have been difficult to understand 
a century ago, or even 40 plus years ago when I was an undergraduate in the 
subject. But, on the other hand, this change has taken place without the 
employment of a coherent account of what goes to make up an individual, 
without, that is, a story that can be told about human nature.  
Thus, unlike the rights of the individual in a domestic legal system, which are 
clearly based in positive law, the international human rights regime appears to 
rest on an account of human universals, and yet is deeply reluctant to admit that 
this is the case.  Mindful of critics of the notion of human rights ranging from 
Jeremy Bentham to Alasdair McIntyre via Karl Marx, rights advocates commonly 
describe rights as ‘useful fictions’, dodging the question ‘useful to whom’? Or 
they argue that human rights are actually part of positive law created by 
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international treaties, in spite of the obvious fact that many states sign-up to 
obligations they have not the slightest intention to honour.  What human rights 
advocates rarely say is that rights rest on human nature – that humans have such 
and such a set of rights because that is what human beings are like.   
Further, international criminal lawyers commonly simply assume that the notion 
of criminal responsibility employed in Western courts can be translated more or 
less intact to international criminal courts.  In fact that notion of criminal 
responsibility rests on a quite contentious notion of what human beings actually 
are like – contentious in the West, I should say, not simply in the rest of the 
world – but, as with rights advocates, this is somewhere where  international 
criminal lawyers would really prefer not to go, because, from their point of view, 
ending ‘impunity’ is more important than establishing the foundations of their 
jurisprudence, and perhaps they recognise that those foundations are distinctly 
unsafe.  
Spelling this out becomes tedious, but, again, theorists of global justice have to 
make judgements as to what it is that people ‘really’ want – because quite often 
and quite plausibly people are assumed to suffer from false consciousness of one 
kind or another – but are deeply reluctant to argue that what people want is 
deeply embedded in their nature as human beings, even though, as the early 
Marx for one appreciated, this is the only kind of argument that can be used to 
distinguish false from ‘true’ consciousness (Marx, 1992). 
Putting these two halves of the argument together, it seems clear (to me at least) 
first, that the rise in importance of the individual cries out for a coherent account 
of human nature, but, second, that arguments from human nature appear to have 
been de-legitimised in contemporary discourse, and, paradoxically, are rarely if 
ever used by those who have created the characteristic institutions of modern 
international individualism.  This is not to say that there are not many people in 
the world today who do not have – and express – strong views about the nature 
of the individual.  For example, Islamic thinkers and the more traditional 
theologians of Christianity have a clear account of who and what human beings 
are – but, of course, they contradict each other and are both rejected by secular 
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Westerners and by adherents to non-theistic religions.  Islam and, in principle 
though often not in practice, Christianity are universalist systems of thought 
grounded in clear views of human nature, but the claims they make are not 
recognised by each other or by third parties.   
This seems to me to constitute a serious and interesting problem.  Obviously 
there are many features of this problem which deserve to be studied at length, 
far more than can be covered in a essay of this scope: one would need to examine 
the rise and fall and, perhaps, rise again of classical notions of natural law; to 
explore the misuse of notions of human nature by social Darwinists and theorists 
of race; and to give an overview of some of the findings and possibilities of 
evolutionary psychology and neuroscience (Connolly, 2002).  What I want to do 
here is much less ambitious – I want to explore how the notion of human nature 
became discredited in the first half of the last century, and to suggest that this 
discrediting rested on a misunderstanding of what the idea involved, a 
misunderstanding that is closely related to the level of generality at which the 
topic is approached. I then want to offer a short defence – it can be no more than 
that – of the notion that contemporary evolutionary psychology has game-
changing potential for our understanding of human nature, even though that 
term itself may have to be abandoned. And, of course, I want to say that one of 
the games that is being, and will be, changed is the game of ‘International 
Relations’ and that our discourse is only dimly aware of this, and for the most 
part draws the wrong conclusions from it. Given the important role that notions 
such as human rights, international criminal law and global justice have both in 
our discipline and in the world of practice, it is important that the task of 
grasping the implications of the new thinking is taken on board by international 
political theorists.  But, finally, it is also important to understand that the new 
scientific account of what it is to be human does not drive out non-scientific 
understandings of our common nature, and to that end I will give the final word 
to the modern novelist who, more than anyone else, attempts to cross the 
boundary between the arts and the sciences. 
How Human Nature Became a Myth 
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There are lots of ways of telling this story.  One popular narrative goes 
something like this: people are different, ‘otherness’ – alterity – is a fact of life, 
but a fact that European, Christian thought has been unable to come to terms 
with. Europeans naturalised their own form of life, treating their way of being in 
the world as defining what it is to be human; two strategies emerged for dealing 
with what appeared to be other forms of life, for example those of the native 
‘Americans’ encountered on the European voyages of discovery (Todorov, 1987).   
From one perspective, that of ‘natural law’ and universal values, differences were 
denied or regarded as superficial; did they but know it these people were really 
like us, sharing our nature, our needs and our desires.  The other possibility was 
that they were genuinely different but inferior – there was only one true way of 
being human, ours, and these people simply did not measure up, weren’t really 
‘people’ at all in the full sense of the term.  The first of these strategies accorded 
best with traditional Christian doctrine, and was continued by some strands of 
Enlightenment and Post-Enlightenment thought (including the aforementioned 
work of the early Marx), but the second was always present, and came to the fore 
in nineteenth century Europe when combined with Social Darwinism and so-
called scientific racism, with horrendous consequences when the implications of 
this position were played out in the twentieth century (Hawkins, 2008).  The key 
point here is that both strategies deny difference, in one case by a superficially 
generous willingness to incorporate, in the other case by a decidedly ungenerous 
rejection of those who fail to meet the required standard. 
Fortunately – this narrative continues – although the twentieth century 
witnessed the worst consequences of this way of thinking about human nature, it 
also witnessed its demise.  The assault on the idea of human nature came from 
many directions.  Marxists set aside Marx’s early thinking about the ‘species-
being’ of humans and developed instead his critique of bourgeois political 
economists who assumed that the laws of motion of capitalist society were 
universal – different modes of production didn’t simply generate different kinds 
of society, they generated different kinds of people (Cohen, 2001).  Sociologists 
followed Durkheim in rejecting ‘reductionist’ explanations of social behaviour; 
only social facts could explain other social facts and human nature could have no 
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explanatory power for social scientists (Durkheim, 1982).  Anthropologists – 
especially those who were the pupils of Frank Boas – produced evidence which 
supported the view that features of what had been thought of as human nature, 
part of the human condition, were actually the product modern western 
industrial societies (Boas, 1982).  Coming of age in Samoa was radically different 
from, less traumatic than, coming of age in the bourgeois west (Mead, 1928); 
even, so it was said, basic notions of ‘colour’ and ‘time’ were not constant 
between societies (Brown, 1991: 9 – 38).   
The message of tolerance that these studies promoted seemed an appropriate 
response to the horrors produced by the racist intolerance of difference – 
although the very unwillingness to tolerate intolerance suggested that some 
universal values were actually present in this work.  Still, in the second half of 
the twentieth century the basic story was redrawn in new ways but to much the 
same effect. Philosophers undermined the correspondence theories of truth 
upon which notions of human nature had been based; observers, it was said, 
could no longer lift up a mirror to nature and read off how things were or should 
be (Rorty, 1981).  In the Wittgensteinian formulation , ‘forms of life’ simply have 
to be accepted as a given, there being no standard against which they could be 
judged (Winch, 1970).  As European political control of the non-European world 
receded, post-colonial theorists have demonstrated the ways in which western 
‘universalism’ privileges certain kinds of reasoning, certain mental categories 
which act to legitimate imperialism and oppression (Williams & Chrisman, 
1993). And feminist theorists point to the role of traditional concepts of human 
nature in providing support for patriarchy, and an account of traditional and 
oppressive gender roles as natural rather than as social creations (MacKinnon, 
2007).  All told, on this account, it seems the notion of ‘human nature’ has a lot to 
answer for; those who use the concept are probably involved in throwing a 
smoke-screen over something that would otherwise be recognised as 
undesirable.   
This critique of human nature from the perspective of a sensitivity to difference  
still has a great deal of mileage in it, although it is also, as noted above, rather 
unhelpful if one wishes to promote human rights and a concern for the individual 
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that rests on universal standards.  It is also worth noting that the suggestion that 
the white European males who are the villains of the story instantiated the only – 
or even the most – xenophobic culture of the last 500 years is obvious nonsense.  
Still, the case against a rigid account of what human beings are is compelling  - 
but is it possible to tell a story about human nature that is less rigid, more plastic, 
less open to manipulation in the interests of the powerful, but still with serious 
content?  I think so, and a good place to start to construct such a story would be 
at the very beginning of Western thought on identity and difference. 
Herodotus and Darius 
Greek thought with its distinction between Hellene and Barbarian gets a bad 
press in the anti-essentialist literature; this is allegedly where the ‘West’ started 
to get things wrong. Anthony Pagden tells this story well in his wide ranging 
Worlds of War: The 2,500 Year Struggle between East and West; the linguistic 
devaluating of foreigners was closely associated with the idea that the 
inhabitants of Asia were essentially ‘Other’ – effeminate, irrational and incapable 
of emulating what the Greeks thought of as their own supreme achievement, 
living in self-governing communities, equal under the law (Pagden, 2008).  But 
he also points out that there is another side to the story: it is interesting, that 
although the classical Greeks distinguished between themselves and barbarians, 
they also possessed a single word for ‘human being’ – anthropos – which covered 
both categories, unlike many other pre-modern cultures.   
A practical demonstration of the same point is given by Herodotus who travelled 
around the then-known world while putting together his history of the wars 
between the Greeks and the Persians.  He was fascinated by the differences 
between the Greeks and their various others, and in approaching these matters 
he was a perceptive and tolerant (albeit somewhat credulous) observer.  In the 
course of his history he relates the story of the Persian Great King Cambyses, 
who mocked the religious beliefs of his Egyptian subjects.  This is seen by 
Herodotus as a sign of insanity; Herodotus thinks that all peoples will believe 
that their own customs are best and tells of a thought-experiment conducted by 
one of Cambyses’ successors, Darius: 
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During his reign, Darius summoned the Hellenes at his court and asked 
them how much money they would accept for eating the bodies of their 
dead fathers.  They answered that they would not do that for any amount 
of money.  Later, Darius summoned some Indians, called Kallatiai, who do 
eat their dead parents.  In the presence of the Hellenes, with an 
interpreter to inform them of what was said, he asked the Indians how 
much money they would accept to burn the bodies of their dead fathers.  
They responded with an outcry, ordering him to shut his mouth lest he 
offend the gods. Well then, that is how people think, and so it seems to me 
that Pindar was right when he said in his poetry that custom is king of all. 
Book 3: 38 (Herodotus, 2008: 224) 
And, of course, as Mary Midgely and Steven Lukes remark, Darius the Persian 
would have known that the correct way to honour the dead is to expose bodies 
on high towers to be eaten by vultures (Midgely, 1991: 78 cited from Lukes, 
2003, 4ff).  
This is a popular story because it is open to many different interpretations.  What 
I want to suggest is that which interpretation one favours, which moral one 
wishes to draw, is largely a function of the level of generality with which one 
approaches the problem.  Exposing one’s parents to the elements, eating them 
and burning them are radically different ways of expressing respect, but they are 
actually all ways of expressing respect – the reason why neither the Hellenes nor 
the Indians will give up their customs is because to do so would be a form of 
sacrilege, horrifying to the gods and unacceptable to any dutiful offspring.  In 
other words, the same story can be told to illustrate the power of ‘difference’ or 
to bring to light a basic similarity, depending on what we hope to get from it.   
We can see two kinds of errors illustrated by this example.  Cambyses’ mistake 
would have been to impose one particular way of showing respect, while 
mocking and/or outlawing the others, and he would have done this in the name 
of nature, regarding the other ways of treating the dead as ‘unnatural’.  Cyrus 
(and Herodotus) approach the ways of others more generously and are prepared 
to regard each of these practices as potentially equally legitimate – but, wrongly, 
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summarise this position as reflecting the view that custom is king, failing to see 
the underlying similarities between the Hellenes, the Kallatiai and the Persians.  
The parallels with twentieth century debates on human nature are, I hope, 
obvious; respect for ‘difference’ and a generous tolerance produce a more 
attractive politics than any attempt to impose one particular ‘form of life’ on all 
others (and this is so even if the form of life in question is not as obviously 
undesirable as the racist, Eurocentric and Social Darwinist versions often 
favoured in the first half of the last century), but such a desirable outcome need 
not be arrived at at the expense of any notion of human nature.  At the right level 
of generality, human nature still does important work. 
Still, if the story told by Herodotus is actually to work the way I suggest it should 
there are three important steps that need to be taken.  First, the basic similarity 
in attitude towards the dead inadvertently identified by Herodotus by itself 
proves nothing; there has to be better evidence for such an underlying similarity, 
and there has to be evidence that there are other features of human conduct that 
are, apparently, universal.  Second, the ontological status of such universals, 
assuming they exist, needs to be explored.  Third, it needs to be shown that all 
this, at least potentially, has an impact on the problems outlined in the 
introduction to this essay. 
The Universal People 
Filling out a little the argument presented above, for much of the twentieth 
century the environment (‘nurture’) was stressed at the expense of nature as the 
key to understanding how humans behave and think.  Naturalist arguments were 
associated with racism and eugenics. The findings of cultural anthropologists 
supported this opposition;  influential studies, the most famous of which was 
Coming of Age in Samoa by Margaret Mead, portrayed societies which were 
unworried about adolescent sexual experimenting and other allegedly modern 
taboos (Mead, 1928).  The nuclear family was likewise seen as culture-specific; 
institutions such as the Kibbutz were as effective ways of raising children as 
male-female pairs.  Reacting to the horrors of 20th century warfare, it became a 
point of principle for many anthropologists to insist that so-called primitive 
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societies were less violent and troubled than industrial societies. In such 
societies war is largely a symbolic affair;  violence had to be seen as learned 
behaviour and learned particularly in modern capitalist states.  This latter 
position was formalised in the so-called ‘Seville Statement on Violence’ in 1986, 
later adopted as official doctrine by UNESCO (Seville Statement of Violence, 
1990).   
These positions were held to be ‘scientifically correct’, to use the Seville 
phraseology; the ‘bad sciences’ of Social Darwinism, Eugenics and Scientific 
Racism were to be driven out not by a ‘good science’ of human nature but by the 
scientific rejection of essentialism.  Like Darius, the anthropologists who 
produced these propositions wanted to show that custom was king, although the 
current preferred terminology had a more scientific ring to it.  Unfortunately, 
well-meaning liberals are as capable of producing bad science as racists, and this 
anti-essentialist position has been pretty much demolished over the last quarter 
century.  Thus, it is now clear that Margaret Mead was the victim of what was 
essentially a practical joke, her informants having made up tall tales which they 
did not expect to be believed – coming of age in Samoa was every bit as stressful 
as it was, and still is, in modern industrial societies (Freeman, 1983; 1999).  
Mead’s work was so central to the consciousness of social anthropologists that 
the American Anthropological Association actually passed a resolution at its 
annual congress condemning the work of Dennis Freeman, the anthropologist 
who revealed that she had been hoaxed, as clear an illustration as one could wish 
of the way in which anti-essentialism had become so much part of the 
intellectual furniture that to challenge it was simply unacceptable – but, of 
course, scientific disagreements cannot be settled by votes of an academic 
association.  The reversal of opinion on violence in pre-modern societies has 
been equally dramatic; here the issue has been a question of interpreting rather 
than challenging the data.  The central point has been statistical – warfare in 
‘primitive’ societies may only lead to the occasional death, but in small societies 
one death can have an impact greater than tens of thousands in modern mass 
societies (Keeley, 1996).  In fact, the probability of violent death for young men 
in primitive societies is higher than in any civilised society at any time period, 
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including the twentieth century which experienced the two most destructive 
wars in human history.  Modern industrial societies are actually the least violent 
of any societies of which we have knowledge. Recently Steven Pinker has 
summarised the arguments here with great force in his The Better Angels of our 
Nature (2011). 
One could go on; contra one popular misconception, the Hopi have much the 
same notion of time as western (and every other) society, and the Eskimos don’t 
have lots more ways of describing snow than any other society – but although 
this sort of anthropological work is valuable in undermining the naïve anti-
essentialist position it doesn’t establish a positive account of what human beings 
are like.  Donald Brown does tentatively provide such an account in his 
description of the ‘universal people’ (UP) synthesising the work of other 
anthropologists (Brown, 1991: 130 – 141).  He begins with features of language 
and grammar – including the use of metaphor and metonym – goes on to look at 
features of human psychology that are universal – distinguishing self and others, 
recognising the self as both subject and object – and then describes universal 
features of social arrangements – including commonalities in child-rearing, the 
division of labour, social stratification, play, ritual, notions of justice, a theory of 
mind, and the presence of a worldview.  His full account runs to around 6,000 
words, packing in far more detail than can be conveyed in this essay.  To a great 
extent, the features of the UP are discerned in the same way that the 
commonality behind burial practices is discerned by a reading of Herodotus – to 
say, for example, that the UP ‘practice magic, and their magic is designed to do 
such things as to sustain and increase life and to win the attention of the 
opposite sex’ 2(op. cit.: 139) requires us to drop the notion that ‘magic’ is 
something only associated with primitive people, and recognise that our own 
behaviour often rests on beliefs about the world that can only be described as 
magical, even though we characteristically dress them up in different clothing. 
                                                        
2 The suggestion that the UP are necessarily heterosexual is unfortunate – had Brown been 
writing 20 years later I suspect he would have referred to winning the attention of sexual 
partners. 
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Brown bases his account of the UP on a synthesis of work by other 
anthropologists; what is the standing of such a synthesis and what work can it 
do?  One might describe what he has done as establishing by induction a kind of 
lowest common denominator for cultural arrangements, true by definition but 
unhelpful for precisely that reason in the same way that the biological needs of 
the human body, although obviously important, tell us little about the social 
arrangements needed to meet them – if this is simply how things are and had to 
be then there is very little else to be said.  But the most interesting fact about the 
common features of the UP is that they could have been different; the human 
need for food, water and a breathable environment is a given – a ‘human being’ 
who did not need sustenance would not actually be a human being – but the 
features of the UP are for the most part not true simply by definition. In Buñuel’s 
film Le Phantôme de la Liberté (1974) people defecate together, sitting on toilets 
around a table, but go off to eat in private – the scene is fascinating precisely 
because, although we (or at least Buñuel) can imagine such a scenario, it is a 
striking fact that no actual society has ever produced such an arrangement.  This 
seems to be a statement of the obvious but that is simply because when 
something is universal it is taken for granted; it takes someone with the 
imagination of Buñuel to reveal to us that things could have been different, but 
aren’t.  Given that they could have been different, it makes sense to ask why the 
UP are as they are. 
Explaining Universals. 
It may be helpful at this point to clarify a little further what is under 
consideration, and in particular to make a rather important distinction between 
the anthropologist’s account of the UP and a normative account of universals 
such as Martha Nussbaum’s account of ‘basic human capabilities’ (Nussbaum, 
2000).  Nussbaum puts together a set of capabilities that are required to live 
what she regards as a normal human existence and there are many points of 
contact with Brown’s account of the UP, but, nonetheless, the two positions rest 
on radically different foundations.  Nussbaum is looking for something like a 
Rawlsian ‘overlapping consensus’ on the capabilities which allow for the living of 
a desirable human existence; this is an explicitly normative project oriented 
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towards changing the world to allow everyone the opportunity to exercise their 
capabilities.  By way of contrast, the features of the UP are simply described 
rather than endorsed by Brown and his sources.  Thus, for example, UP life is 
described as characterised by conflict and in-group, out-group antagonisms; this 
is nor a normative proposition – there is no suggestion that this is desirable 
feature of the UP, nor does it follow that because UP life has been characterised 
in this way it will continue to be so.   
This latter is an important point; a great deal of the discontent generated by the 
use of the term human nature stems from the misguided notion that to say 
something is natural is the same as saying (i) that it is good and (ii) that it is 
unchangeable.   Neither inference follows; the features of the way of life of the UP 
certainly emerged for a reason (and we may want to use the shorthand term 
human nature to describe the end result of this process) but that in itself does 
not require us to value them, nor do we need to accept that they are 
unchangeable.    
It is worth stressing this point because of the predictable reaction to the next 
stage of the argument, which is that it is clear to me that if the UP is not simply a 
figment of our imagination, if there really are universal features of culture and 
society, then the most likely explanation for this is that these features are the 
product of human evolution via natural selection.  Past experience suggests that 
this simple statement will be read, quite wrongly, as an endorsement of these 
features, an attempt to give them a status that they do not deserve.  In the 
nineteenth century when it first became clear that nature ‘red in tooth and claw’ 
was not simply a literary conceit but a graphic description of natural selection, 
the social Darwinists, led by Herbert Spencer, deemed this to be a desirable 
feature of human society, and began the process that led to the justifications for 
racism and imperialism referred to above (Spencer, 1982).  Conversely, when in 
the early 1970s Edward O. Wilson revived the application of Darwinism to what 
he called ‘human sociobiology’ he was attacked by those on the left who saw this 
as leading to an endorsement of racism, patriarchy and so on (Wilson, 1975; 
Sahlins, 1977; Gould, 1981; Rose et al 1984).  In both cases, the same error was 
enacted, albeit to different political purposes.  Spencer et al adopted Darwinism 
 14 
because they believed it endorsed views about social and political life they 
already held, the critics of sociobiology opposed this discourse because they 
believed in undermined the possibility of a progressivist politics.  Both groups 
were mistaken; the results of human evolution neither endorse nor undermine 
any particular political programme. 
To illustrate the point that to describe something as ‘natural’ is not to 
endorse it, consider the case of male violence.   It does seem to be the case that 
males, especially young men, have a ‘natural’ tendency (i.e. a genetic 
predisposition) towards violence but it is clearly highly desirable that this 
tendency be controlled, and there is also plenty of evidence that it can be –  the 
institutions of the UP reflect this desire and the relatively low levels of violence 
in modern industrial societies as opposed to their predecessors indicates that 
control is indeed possible (Archer, 1994).  The message here is not that, simply 
because it is natural, male violence is somehow inevitable but rather that it 
would be unwise to design human institutions on the basis that such violence is 
learned behaviour, with the concomitant that, with the right kind of education 
and social environment, restraints on violent behaviour would be unnecessary.   
To put the matter differently, it is never going to be possible simply to read off an 
account of human flourishing from an anthropology.  Scientific knowledge of the 
human animal will not tell us what sort of society we ought to promote, or what 
kind of rights we ought to assign to individuals, or, indeed, what kind of human 
capabilities we ought to allow to develop.  But, on the other hand, it may 
eventually provide us with a set of parameters within which a substantive 
account of human flourishing will have to be constructed, and a set of problems 
(like male violence) which this account will have to cope with. 
So, what does ‘scientific knowledge of the human animal’ actually teach us?  
Wilson’s first attempt at a human sociobiology – in the final chapter of a book 
that was essentially concerned with social insects – was rather crude, and 
attracted justified criticism – although the extreme opposition from figures such 
as Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Leowontin and the Sociobiology Study Group 
reflected non-scientific agendas (Segerstrale, 2000).  Again, although Richard 
Dawkins in The Selfish Gene (1976) explicitly argued against anti-progressivist 
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readings of his work (his own views were, and are, politically radical) the very 
title of this book, with its association of a human quality, selfishness, with 
something non-human invited and received criticism.  Thirty years plus on from 
these pioneering works, sociobiology has been rebranded as ‘evolutionary 
psychology’ and is now very firmly grounded in experimental as well as 
theoretical work (Barcow, et al, 1992; Dunbar & Barrett, 2007). – and even 
quasi-popularisations such as those by Steven Pinker, Daniel Dennett and Matt 
Ridley are light-years away from the crudities of e.g. Desmond Morris and Robert 
Ardrey in the 1960s  (Ardrey, 1966; Morris, 1967; Pinker, 2002, 2007, 2011; 
Dennett, 2004).  The arguments that were used against Wilson and Dawkins in 
the 1970s are still used today, but with much less plausibility (Sahlins, 2008; 
Bell, 2006).   
Part of the story of this increased sophistication consists actually of moving away 
from the notion of human nature, which now would be regarded as a very crude 
shorthand expression by most evolutionary psychologists (it still has quite a lot 
of popular resonance, however, which is why I continue to use it, albeit in scare 
quotes, in the title of this essay).  Instead the product of evolution is seen to take 
the form of multiple mechanisms which, taken together, and combined with the 
environment, produce actual human behaviour – use of the term ‘human nature’ 
implies a constant; newer thinking certainly rests on the idea that some things 
are constant but at a much more disaggregated level (Dunbar & Barrett, 2007). 
Using the IT analogies that are more or less unavoidable nowadays, it is agreed 
by both evolutionary psychologists and their (scientific) critics that the brain can 
be seen as general-purpose problem-solving computer which comes with a basic 
operating system on board, an operating system that evolved in the ancestral 
environment through natural selection.  The core issue is what programmes are 
pre-installed by this process.  Even the most extreme opponents of evolutionary 
psychology agree that there are some such programmes – for example, it is 
impossible to believe that children would be able to learn how to use language as 
quickly as they do without the capacity to learn a language being already in some 
sense present in the brain –  and the real question is how extensive is this 
programming?  The minimalist position suggests, not very.  The capacity to think 
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and to use language may be the product of evolution, but what is thought is the 
product of culture; the notion that human beings have a particular nature that is 
the product of evolution and is therefore heritable is, on this account, only 
acceptable to a very limited degree. This is the position evolutionary 
psychologists call the ‘Standard Social Science Model’. 
The alternative position is that the brain is a general-purpose, problem-solving  
computer which comes pre-loaded with a great deal of software that was 
developed in the ancestral environment.  On this account there are a many, 
potentially thousands of psychological mechanisms that have evolved over 
millions of years and are present in normal human brains.  These mechanisms 
combine with each other in complex ways, and inter-act with the environment.  
This environment does not interact with some kind of ‘blank slate’, but with a 
slate that is, metaphorically, covered with writing (Pinker, 2002).  Because of 
complexity and interaction with the environment, the crude notion that these 
mechanisms directly affect behaviour is unsustainable, but the idea that we have 
certain pre-dispositions hard-wired into us by evolution is more difficult to 
dispose of. The aim of evolutionary psychology is to identify such mechanisms 
via experimental and other methods.  
A couple of illustration with considerable implications for the conduct of 
international relations may help to show what is meant by a mechanism in this 
context.  First, there is good evidence that mentally healthy people tend to 
exhibit psychological biases that encourage optimism; such biases, ‘positive 
illusions’, may well influence decision-making in the direction of risk-taking, and 
Dominic Johnson and his collaborators have explored this phenomenon at some 
length (Johnson,  2004; Johnson et al, 2006).  Several points are important here; 
first, the actual operation of positive illusions is a function of all sorts of 
individual, cultural and political factors – the bias is always in the background, 
but actual behaviour will depend on personality types, mental states, decision-
making procedures and so on. Second, forewarned is forearmed; far from it being 
the case that this bias must always be in play, the fact that one knows it exists, 
encourages the development of institutional restraints precisely in order to 
prevent it from working.  Third, evolutionary psychologists are often accused of 
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inventing post-hoc ‘Just So’ stories to justify their findings, but this particular 
mechanism is not associated with such a story; because the mind works in this 
way there is a prima facie case in favour of the supposition that this mechanism 
has been selected for, but its existence doesn’t depend on any particular 
narrative. 
Second, another, very thoroughly researched mechanism focuses on the capacity 
of human beings to understand social exchanges and, in particular, to spot 
individuals who ‘cheat’.  Since many accounts of altruism stress reciprocity, it 
seems plausible that the capacity to indentify people who do not respect 
promises they have made would be selected for, and experiments conducted 
using variants of the Wason Selection Task give evidence that it has been 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1992).  This is a logic problem designed to test how good 
individuals are at identifying a ‘material conditional’; the answer is, not very, 
when the Task involves the manipulation of abstract symbols – but when exactly 
the same Task is described in terms of social relations (a classic example 
involves spotting whether the age rules on drinking alcohol are being observed) 
people do much better. The hypothesis is that we have no inherited capacity to 
solve logic problems, but we are extremely good at spotting whether rules are 
being followed.  This is a mechanism which is selected for, but, conversely, there 
was no advantage in the ancestral environment associated with being able to 
spot a ‘material conditional’ in an abstract problem. 
As yet, evolutionary scientists are nowhere near able to give anything like a full 
account of the mechanisms that underlie human behaviour, but the outlines of a 
picture are beginning to emerge.  In The Blank Slate, Steven Pinker, who is more 
willing to generalise than most, summarised the evidence as it then stood in a 
series of generalisations, which clearly will be refined over time, but, as things 
stand, are very well supported; human beings, left to their own devices, tend to 
be selfish and somewhat violent animals (Pinker, 2002). We are biased in favour 
of our kin and immediate circle of friends, and are potentially ethnocentric, 
violent and domineering.  Co-operative behaviour is kin-based or based on 
reciprocity.   This clearly reinforces the picture painted by Brown of the 
‘universal people’; thus, more extended systems of co-operation rely on a degree 
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of coercion to minimise free-riding, and, contrary to the myth of the peaceful 
‘garden’, beloved of the counter-culture of the 1960s and perhaps today, the 
existence of authoritative and coercion-based political institutions is central to 
minimizing inter-personal violence. 
Implications? 
The International Relations community has taken on board some of this work, 
but not in such as way as to address the questions raised in the introduction to 
this presentation.  Some of the work of biologists in developing theories of 
animal behaviour employs game-theoretic methods, and the connections here to 
studies of co-operative behaviour in international relations are obvious – for 
example, Robert Axelrod’s classic The Evolution of Co-operation draws 
extensively on neo-Darwinian biology and in a famous collaborative paper with 
Robert O. Keohane, applies this thinking to international co-operation (Axelrod, 
1984; Axelrod & Keohane, 1985).  More recently the insights of evolutionary 
psychology have been applied more systematically to conflict and security 
studies; books by Bradley Thayer and Stephen Peter Rosen, and an authoritative 
collection edited by Raphael Sagarin and Terence Taylor give a sense of where 
this work is going (Thayer, 2004; Rosen, 2005; Sagarin and Taylor 2008).  On the 
whole, these authors are careful in the claims they make about the status of their 
work and they deserve to be read rather more widely within the security studies 
community than it seems they are – as with Dominic Johnson’s work referred to 
above, a major and laudable aim of much of this middle-level theorising is to 
identify, and give a less anecdotal account of, the biases that shape decision-
making on security issues.   
The picture is less encouraging when it comes to the contribution of the new 
sciences to the core topics of international political theory and in particular to 
the issue of human nature.  The problem here is that this is an area that 
positively invites over-generalisation and moving beyond the kind of 
mechanisms that can be identified with a degree of reliability to making grand 
statement of the sort that are certainly currently premature, but may actually 
never be possible.  The kind of summary statement of mechanisms drawn from  
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Pinker and cited above, and the exercise of generalisation that lead Brown to 
create a picture of the Universal People are, I think, valuable heuristic exercises, 
but do not yet provide the foundations for an account of ‘human nature’ that can 
be related to the current international human rights regime and its associated 
spin-offs.  Still, some valuable general studies do exist.  Larry Arnhart’s attempt 
to combine Darwinian thinking with essentially Aristotelian notions of natural 
right is ambitious and thought-provoking and Peter Singer’s concise plea for a 
‘Darwinian left’ is a useful corrective to those who regard this work as essentially 
conservative if not reactionary, but neither of these two works from the late 
1990s has actually generated a research programme (Arnhart, 1998; Singer, 
1999). The problem with both these studies is that they are actually rooted in 
Aristotelianism and utilitarianism respectively, and the value-added from a 
Darwinian perspective looks rather marginal unless one is already pre-disposed 
to take this perspective seriously. 
More promising, although also rooted in another discourse, this time economics 
broadly-defined, is the work of writers such as Ken Binmore and Herbert Gintis.  
Binmore, a mathematician and game-theorist, develops a moral theory which he 
believes to be culturally and evolutionarily stable – a non-technical version of the 
argument is his Natural Justice ; see also a recent short summary paper available 
online (Binmore, 2005 & 2009).  He assumes individuals to be essentially self-
regarding and continually faced with social dilemmas of the kind summarised by 
game theorists – prisoner’s dilemma, ‘battle of the sexes’ and so on; the standard 
game theoretic position (summarised as the ‘folk theorem’) is that such 
dilemmas can be solved with high-levels of cooperation if accurate information is 
readily available, and the game is played repeatedly.  These conditions are rarely 
achieved in modern societies but in the evolutionary environment, where small 
populations are facing the same dilemmas over and over again, and where it is 
impossible to keep information about outcomes private, such high levels of co-
operation can be achieved and, he suggests, are. 
The world Binmore describes is essentially egalitarian, and coercive measure to 
achieve co-operation do not play a major role, but on his account individuals 
remain essentially self-regarding, even if they are capable of high levels of 
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cooperative behaviour – and, because of this egoism, outside of the evolutionary 
environment coercive ways of ensuring cooperative behaviour will be necessary.  
Herbert Gintis, another major developer of evolutionary game theory,  while 
supportive of the kind of reasoning Binmore employs, takes issue with the 
assumption that evolution has created such self-regarding individuals (Gintis, 
2006, 2009).  Along with Binmore, Gintis assumes that the ancestral 
environment was essentially egalitarian, lacking the means by which a minority 
could impose institutions on the majority, but he suggests that this environment 
will actually produce a situation where the personal fitness of those who have 
the genetic capacity to internalise norms of ‘strong reciprocity’ will be enhanced.  
More accurately – but still oversimplifying – he suggests that  it is the capacity to 
internalise norms that enhances fitness, and strong reciprocity is a by product of 
this capacity, but the central point is clear;  
[h]uman beings are constituted, by virtue of their evolutionary history, to 
behave as altruistic co-operators and punishers whose egalitarian 
predilections stem from a long history of enforced egalitarianism in the 
hunter-gatherer societies from which modern humanity emerged. (Gintis, 
2006: 25). 
This is a rather more favourable picture of the ancestral environment that 
offered by not just Binmore, but also Pinker et al, and empirical evidence from 
existing hunter-gatherer societies suggests that egalitarianism, although real at 
some levels, is perhaps more limited in scope than Gintis suggests.  Still, the 
value of his work is considerable, not least as a corrective to the work of those 
evolutionary economists whose work is essentially designed to show that the 
norms of capitalism corresponds to our ‘animal spirits’ (Akerlof & Schiller, 
2009).  It is also the case that Gintis’s standing as one of the doyens of 
radical/Marxian political economy in the US reinforces the point that a 
materialist account of ‘human nature’ does not necessarily rest on an extreme 
environmentalism.  
Conclusion: Back to Herodotus and the Classical Greeks.  
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It seems to me that the kind of work on altruism undertaken by Binmore and 
Gintis – supported perhaps by research by neuroscientists into ‘mirror neurons’, 
which provides physical evidence of our capacity to share the grief and joy of 
others (Slack,  2007) – may in the medium run provide us with a much firmer 
basis for thinking about humanity and humanitarianism than we have at the 
moment.  But we aren’t there yet, and for the time being we are still obliged to 
talk about these issues using metaphor and telling stories, albeit metaphors and 
stories which are consistent with the existing level of scientific knowledge.   
Herodotus tells us one such story, and Charles Darwin tells another, that I think 
can be read in the same way, in his book The Expression of the Emotions in Man 
and Animals (Darwin, 1998).  This book has a strange history.  The basic thesis is 
that facial expressions conveying disgust, pleasure, sadness and so on are the 
same in all humans, and indeed in all the higher primates, and the book was 
explicitly written to combat the racist notion that there were higher and lower 
races, as well as the more traditional Christian belief that there was an 
unbridgeable gulf between man and ape.  In spite of this motivation, the 
anthropological wisdom of the first half of the twentieth century was that this 
was simply one more attempt to promote universalist ideas as the expense of a 
healthy attitude to difference, and the empirical basis of Darwin’s thesis was 
rejected a priori.  Then Paul Ekman, editor of the 1998 edition of Darwin’s book, 
actually carried out controlled experiments in New Guinea, Japan and the US – 
reported in his Introduction and Afterword – which showed that Darwin was 
more or less correct; people from wildly different cultures do indeed usually 
recognise the same emotions in given facial expressions.  To my mind, the 
interesting feature of this work is that, as with Herodotus, common humanity is 
revealed at one level of generality when it might be missed at another.  Different 
cultural environments produce different objects of disgust, but the idea that 
some things are disgusting is universal, as is the physiological response to 
something that is perceived to be disgusting. 
The ‘nature’ of human beings is always going to be found in the relationship 
between those things about us that are genuinely universal, rooted in our genes, 
and those things about us that our shaped by our culture.  As time goes by we 
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will learn more and more about the former, but the relationship between the 
two, identity and difference, will continue to be crucial.   Science is involved, but 
not only science, and the interplay between identify and difference, between a 
common humanity and cultural differences, can as well be illustrated by 
literature as by scientific papers.  Crossing boundaries is the theme of this 
conference and I will end this address by allowing a noted boundary crosser, the  
finest living English novelist (unscientific opinion, firmly held) to drive the point 
home.  
Ian McEwan is fascinated by the new human sciences. The protagonist of one of 
his best novels, Saturday (2005), is a neurosurgeon whose work is described in 
apparently accurate detail therein, and in his latest, Solar (2010), his protagonist, 
a physicist, as a result of a chance remark gets drawn into an acrimonious debate 
about gender and evolutionary psychology which is described in considerable 
and accurate detail.  In a short, well-informed essay, ‘Literature, Science and 
Human Nature’ (2006), he makes more sense of the relationship between 
nurture and nature than most social or natural scientists.  After a thoughtful 
review of many of the sources discussed above, he ends by looking at a text of an 
even earlier Greek vintage than Herodotus, Homer’s Odyssey.  He chooses to 
focus on the deeply moving lines at the end of the story where Penelope first 
hesitates, confused by his changed appearance, but then recognises that her 
husband Odysseus has indeed finally returned from his long exile. McEwan 
comments: 
[C]ustoms may change – dead suitors may be lying in the hallway, with no 
homicide charges pending. But we recognise the human essence of these 
lines. Within the emotional and the expressive, we remain what we are.  
In a coda on the human genome project he contemplates the ‘metaphorical 
convergence’ of literature and science: 
That which binds us, our common nature, is what literature has always, 
knowingly and helplessly, given voice to.  And it is this universality which 
science, now entering another of its exhilarating moments, is set to 
explore.  (McEwan, 2006: 58) 
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